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Red	lines	and	compromises:	how	flexible	is	public
opinion	about	Brexit	negotiations?
The	heated	nature	of	the	public	discourse	around	Brexit	suggests	that	the
British	public	are	not	in	a	compromising	mood,	but	is	there	evidence	to	back
this	up?	Lindsay	Richards	and	Anthony	Heath	(Nuffield	College,
Oxford)	set	out	to	discover	what	people	think	about	the	various	aspects	of
the	EU	negotiations.	Where	are	people	more	willing	to	compromise	and	what
do	they	say	are	the	‘red	lines’?	Their	results	suggest	there	is	more	to	see
than	the	‘two	tribes’	politics	of	leave	and	remain.
In	our	study,	we	asked	5000	people	to	imagine	themselves	at	the	negotiating	table	with	the	EU	trying	to	get	the
best	possible	deal	for	the	UK.	We	provided	a	list	of	seven	important	issues	and	asked	respondents	whether	they
would	drop	the	demand	(“deal”)	or	if	they	would	be	prepared	to	negotiate	(“budge”)	or	if	this	was	an	issue	on
which	they	are	absolutely	unwilling	to	compromise	(“red	line”).
We	find	(Fig	1)	that	people	seem	to	care	the	most	about	citizens’	rights	with	48%	naming	this	as	a	red	line,	while
47%	mention	that	future	contributions	to	the	EU	budget	are	a	no-go.	Law-making	(aka	sovereignty)	comes	in	at
third	with	38%	followed	by	stopping	free	movement	of	people	at	36%.		People	were	the	least	likely	to	designate
the	Irish	border	as	a	red	line.	This	was	also	the	item	with	the	highest	level	of	‘Can’t	say’,	suggesting	perhaps	that
it	is	just	not	such	a	salient	issue	to	most	people	in	the	UK	(not	surprisingly,	the	majority	of	our	respondents	in
Northern	Ireland	say	it	is	a	red	line	–	57%).
Figure	1	People	are	most	likely	to	mention	citizens’	rights	and	budget	contributions	as	the	‘red	lines’	in
the	Brexit	negotiations
Data	collected	online	by	Kantar	Public	in	July	and	August	2017;	N	=	5,300;	post-stratification	weights	applied
Since	the	onset	of	the	negotiations,	there	has	been	plenty	of	chatter	about	“soft”	and	“hard”	Brexit.	The	so-called
“hard	Brexit”	position	is	one	that	prioritizes	escaping	the	jurisdiction	of	the	ECJ	and	regaining	control	of
immigration.	“Soft	Brexit”	options,	on	the	other	hand,	might	involve	staying	inside	the	customs	union	and/	or	the
single	market,	and	could	involve	the	continued	free	movement	of	people	(a	bit	like	the	“Norway	option”	–	you	can
find	a	helpful	summary	of	the	“options”	here).
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But	do	these	abstract	political	positions	map	onto	individual	attitudes?
We	found	five	types	of	attitude	cluster	(shown	in	Fig	2).	The	first	of	these	groups	tended	to	feel	they	didn’t	have
enough	information	to	say	(a	quite	reasonable	position	given	how	complex	and	heated	the	whole	thing	is)	but	are
just	6%	of	the	sample.	We	have	a	group	of	“Negotiators”	(9%)	who	would	be	willing	to	budge	on	most	issues,	and
a	group	of	“Deal-Makers”	(15%)	who	are	most	willing	to	drop	the	UK’s	demands	in	order	to	get	a	good	deal.	We
have	two	groups	with	lots	of	red	lines,	but	these	two	groups	are	differentiated	by	which	particular	items	they	care
most	about.	Our	“Red	Line	Liberals”	(24%)	are	most	likely	to	name	collaborations	with	the	EU	and	citizens’	rights
as	their	red	lines.	The	“Red	Line	Traditionalists”	(46%)	on	the	other	hand,	prioritise	budget	contributions	and
sovereignty.
Figure	2	Types	of	Brexit	attitude
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Data	collected	online	by	Kantar	Public	in	July	and	August	2017;	N	=	5,300.	The	chart	shows	conditional
probability	estimates	based	on	a	latent	class	model
Our	Red	Line	Traditionalists	are	therefore	much	closer	to	the	hard	Brexit	ideal	of	leaving	the	jurisdiction	of	the
European	Court	of	Justice	and	so	on,	while	the	Red	Line	Liberals	are	closer	to	the	soft	Brexit	option	with	little
concern	for	stopping	the	free	movement	of	people.	We	might	think	of	our	Negotiators	and	Deal-makers	as	types
of	‘soft’	options	too.
It	is	worth	emphasising	that	none	of	our	groups	prioritise	access	to	the	single	market	above	all	else.	In	general,	it
seems,	where	people	feel	strongly,	they	are	much	more	concerned	with	non-economic	aspects	of	independence
and	nationalism	(the	traditionalists)	and	with	closeness	of	a	social	kind,	i.e.	collaboration	and	shared	rights	(the
liberals).
But	do	the	hard	and	soft	attitudinal	clusters	map	on	to	how	people	voted	in	the	EU	referendum?	See	Fig	3.	It	does
not	seem	surprising	that	the	majority	of	leave	voters	are	Red	Line	Nationalists.	However,	what	is	perhaps
surprising	is	that	one	third	of	leave	voters	(6+13+13)	do	not	fit	the	hard	Brexit	profile.	We	also	find	that	29%	of
remain	voters	have	attitudes	that	do	fit	the	hard	Brexit	profile.	This	may	suggest	a	great	deal	of	variation	in
attitudes	and	vote	choice…	Indeed,	vote	choice	may	have	been	in	spite	of,	rather	than	because	of	preferences	on
particular	issues.	It	certainly	suggests	that	honouring	the	will	of	the	people	throughout	the	negotiations	is	not	as
straightforward	as	usually	assumed.
Figure	3	Types	of	Brexit	attitude	by	referendum	vote	choice
Data	collected	online	by	Kantar	Public	in	July	and	August	2017;	Self-reported	vote	choice,	with	non-voters
dropped.	N	=	4,900;	weighted
These	are	early	findings	from	a	new	project	at	the	Centre	for	Social	Investigation,	Nuffield	College.	It	is	still	early
days	in	terms	of	understanding	public	opinion	on	these	matters,	which	are	newly	salient,	complex,	and	likely	to	be
volatile.	To	date	few	studies	exist,	but	for	further	reading	we	would	recommend	this	report	by	Natcen,	this	post	by
the	research	team	at	the	LSE,	and	CSI’s	own	summary	report.
Lindsay	Richards	is	a	post	doctoral	research	fellow	at	the	Centre	for	Social	Investigation	at	Nuffield	College,
University	of	Oxford.
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Anthony	Heath	is	the	Director	of	the	Centre	for	Social	Investigation	at	Nuffield	College,	Oxford.	He	is	Emeritus
Professor	of	Sociology	at	the	University	of	Oxford.	The	CSI	can	be	found	on	Twitter	@csinuffield.
Ideas	in	this	piece	were	originally	presented	at	the	EPOP	2017	conference	hosted	by	the	School	of	Politics	and
International	Relations	between	8-10	September	2017.	It	was	first	published	at	Ballots	&	Bullets.
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